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 Human Rights and State Despotism
 in Kenya: Institutional Problems
 Makau wa Mutua*
 Autocracy: Basis for Human Rights Abuses
 Kenya's post-independence history has been marked by sharp
 contradiction between the state and civil society in spite of the image,
 created in the West during the Cold War, that the east African nation was
 the beacon of hope in Africa.' Not even the contested presidential and
 parliamentary elections in 1992, the first of their kind in decades, have
 brought relief from state-directed human rights violations, a problem that
 has become the trademark of the Nairobi government.2 The seeds of an
 autocratic state were planted right at independence when in 1964 the
 minority Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), under the leadership
 of Daniel arap Moi, Kenya's president since 1978, voluntarily dissolved
 itself and joined the Kenya African National Union (KANU), headed by the
 nation's first president, Jomo Kenyatta. The merger made Kenya a defacto
 one-party state and paved the way for a despotic executive.3
 In the absence of an opposition, although the constitution allowed
 parliamentary democracy, Kenyatta quickly created a highly centralized,
 authoritarian republic, reminiscent of the colonial state. Although Oginga
 Odinga broke from KANU in 1966 to form the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU),
 Kenyatta crushed it in 1969 and detained all its principal leaders.4 For all
 practical purposes, Kenya remained a one-party state. With the
 legalization of political monopoly, and following a failed coup attempt by
 the air force in 1982, Moi perfected the repressive state crafted by Kenyatta
 through party control of civic groups, trade unions, the press, the
 *Makau wa Mutua is Project Director for the Human Rights Program at the Harvard Law School, Pound Hall 401,
 Cambridge, MA 02138.
 1. For an exhaustive catalog of human rights violations by the Kenya government, see Africa Watch, Taking Liberties
 (Washington, DC: Africa Watch, 1991). The report is the most comprehensive itemization of abuses by the government
 to date.
 2. Multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections were held for the first time in 26 years in 1992.
 3. KANU, the nationalist party, was formed in 1960. It enjoyed widespread support among the Kikuyu, Luo, Akamba,
 and Luhyia, the country's main ethnic groups and won decisively the independence elections in 1963. KADU was
 orchestrated by the British settler and business interests. While its leaders presented it as the champion of the smaller
 ethnic groups it was in reality the vehicle for the protection of British settler property interests.
 4. The KPU was banned in 1969, following an anti-government demonstration in Kisumu, Odinga's ancestral home.
 At least 10 people were killed by security forces. KPU leaders were detained under the 1966 Preservation of the Public
 Security Act (PPSA), the detention law passed by Kenyatta to silence critics.
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 parliament, and, critically, the judiciary. Political murder, detention
 without trial, and false, politically motivated charges became the business
 of the state.5 The period between 1982 and 1990 was characterized by
 extreme government repression of its opponents. But the end of the Cold
 War exposed client states and emboldened reformers; in Kenya, veteran
 oppositionists, and a young professional reformist class of lawyers, the
 press, academics, and church leaders rode the global pro-democracy wave
 and prevailed on KANU in December 1991 to allow political competition.
 Moi claimed throughout that Kenya was not ready for liberal
 democracy and repeatedly accused the West for using aid to force free
 elections. He warned that such changes would result in chaos and ethnic
 killings. KANU thereafter took every step to hobble the opposition and
 steal the election. First beginning in February 1992, it orchestrated and
 engineered the worst intercommunal violence in the nation's history. The
 killings of Kikuyus and Luos within the Rift Valley, Kenya's breadbasket,
 by members of the Kalenjin community, from which Moi comes, were
 ostensibly spurred by land disputes. In reality, the government used its
 agents and material to spark the killings to punish the opposition and drive
 it from the province. The killings, which continue to date, have left
 hundreds, perhaps thousands, dead and many more homeless. The
 government also refused to register millions of eligible voters in opposition
 strongholds, packed the electoral commission with its supporters, and
 denied the opposition access to the media and permits for rallies.6 These
 problems, and an opposition divided along ethnic lines, resulted in Moi's
 victory. Since then, KANU has returned to one-party style politics,
 suppressing dissent, harassing opponents, and fanning the killings of
 innocents in opposition areas. Public institutions, such as the executive
 organs and the judiciary have continued as the instruments of repression
 despite the 1992 elections.7
 5. The most celebrated case of political murder during the Moi regime thus far has been that of Robert Ouko in
 February 1990-the urbane foreign minister who reportedly fell out with Nicholas Biwott, Moi's right hand man. A
 commission of inquiry was disbanded by Moi when it appeared close to implicating him and other senior aides in the
 murder. See Makau wa Mutua "A Break with the Past?" Africa Report, vol. 37, no. 1 January-February 1992), pp. 21-
 24.
 6. Brian Atwood, "Kenya's Rigged Election," Christian Science Monitor (2 September 1992). In that article, Atwood,
 then president of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the current Administrator of the U.S.
 Agency for International Development, blasted the Moi government for taking steps to steal the election and charged
 that "human rights abuses have increased, opposition rallies have been hampered, opposition political leaders have
 been jailed, and violent episodes designed to incite ethnic conflict have been traced directly to Kenya's official security
 and police services."
 7. The three main opposition political parties, Oginga Odinga's Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD-
 Kenya), Kenneth Matiba's FORD-Asili, and Mwai Kibaki's Democratic Party (DP) took over 80 seats in the 188 member
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 Suppression of Speech and Association Rights
 Arguably, no other rights are more important than speech and
 association rights in a liberal democratic regime. The KANU government
 has managed until 1992 to hold the monopoly on power by denying these
 basic freedoms. Without a doubt the elections allowed an incremental
 jump in the level of public debate; previously forbidden subjects such as
 the transfer of power or the nature of the presidency were opened to public
 debate. Political parties, private media, and non-governmental
 organizations, including those addressing human rights, were launched
 under the assumption that it was their legal right to join public discourse
 on governance and the accountability of public officials. The newly
 inaugurated multiparty assembly was expected to assume its role not
 merely as the legislative arm but as the conscience of the nation and a
 check on executive authority as well. But Moi has since proven that
 despotism cannot be overcome without the thorough reform of public
 institutions.
 As if to thump his nose at the notion of parliamentary supremacy, Moi
 has returned to the past with attacks on members of parliament (MPs).
 Opposition parliamentarians who speak publicly on matters of national
 importance-especially matters implicating government misconduct-have
 been arrested and jailed. A case in point is Njenga Mungai, a FORD-Asili
 MP who was picked up in August 1993 for meeting some of his
 constituents rendered homeless by the ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley. In
 1993 alone, for example, up to 21 opposition MPs were arrested and jailed.
 The arrests have been motivated by the government's attempt either to
 prohibit a planned action, such as a demonstration, or to prevent MPs from
 highlighting an incident implicating the government. For instance, FORD-
 Asili MP for Nakuru North, Bishop Joseph Kamau Kimani, was arrested on
 2 November 1993 for attempting to enter the Bahati Police Station in
 Nakuru to investigate the death of three men who had allegedly attempted
 to raid the station. He had publicly questioned the government's
 allegation, for which he was arrested and charged with "publishing a
 malicious rumor."8 The latest of such arrests is that of Professor Anyang'
 parliament although they garnered 69.9 percent of the votes cast in the parliamentary poll. For a comprehensive
 analysis of the processes leading up to the election, see National Election Monitoring Unit, The Multi-Party General
 Elections In Kenya (Nairobi: NEMU, 1993). For a report on the period just prior to the election, see International
 Human Rights Law Group, Facing the Pluralist Challenge: Human Rights and Democratization in Kenya's
 December 1992 Multi-Party Elections (Washington, D.C.: IHRLG, 1992).
 8. Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, Failing the Democratic Challenge: Freedom of Expression
 in Multi-Party Kenya (Washington, D.C.: RFKMCHR, 1993), p. 25. Other MPs arrested in 1993 included Raila Odinga,
 FORD-Kenya MP for Langata in Nairobi, Ferdinand Obure, FORD-Kenya MP, Kamau Icharia, FORD-Asili MP, and
 Abdullahi Sheik Ahmed, Mandere East MP, ibid., pp. 30-31.
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 Nyong'o, the acclaimed political scientist and MP for Kisumu Rural, who
 was arrested in February 1995 for criticizing government allegations that
 a guerilla movement was out to overthrow it.9 Also arrested in February
 was Rongo MP, Aluoch Polo, for "insulting" Moi; he has been charged with
 sedition."' The arrests appear to have had a chilling effect on the ability of
 MPs to speak openly.
 Just as it had done during the electoral season, the government has not
 hesitated to use the Public Order Act to silence opposition political activity.
 According to this law, local administrators can deny permits for meetings
 and rallies. Leading opposition politicians such as Paul Muite, Kikuyu MP
 and former chair of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), has been repeatedly
 barred from holding public rallies. Kaluki Mwenda, MP for Kitui Central
 has on several occasions had public meetings that she was scheduled to
 address dispersed by security forces. In by-elections to fill vacant
 parliamentary posts in 1994, police and security forces repeatedly
 disrupted opposition rallies and beat up supporters. In the event, a
 demoralized opposition has seen its numbers dwindle as KANU has
 financed a number of key defections and coerced others. A stunning
 defection was that of John Keen, the Democratic Party's (DP) secretary-
 general, who crossed over to KANU in February 1995."
 Two more recent events appear designed to further cripple free speech.
 The government, faced with an unrepentant opposition, has escalated the
 rhetoric of paranoia. With constant references to the "peace" and "stability"
 enjoyed by Kenyans in contrast to neighboring countries such as Rwanda
 or Somalia, Moi has played up the security of the state in recent months.
 He has named two allegedly clandestine organizations which he claims
 plan to violently overthrow his government. The first, the February
 Eighteen Popular Resistance Army (FERA) or the February Eighteen
 Movement (FEM), is allegedly based in Uganda, and plans to cause
 Rwanda-like chaos in Kenya.'2 The second, the Kenya Patriotic Front, is
 alleged to be working with FERA to accomplish that goal.'3 These charges
 give the government an excuse to tighten security measures and closely
 9. "MP arrested for criticizing claim that guerillas trying to overthrow government," BBC Summary of World
 Broadcasts (London) (17 February 1995).
 10. "Opposition MP arrested, to be charged with sedition," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (London) (18 February
 1995).
 1 1. Indian Ocean Newsletter (Paris) (11 February 1995).
 12. Ibid.
 13. "Moi says second clandestine grotip working to overthrow the government," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
 (London) (16 February 1995).
 4th Quarter, 1994 53
 monitor opposition activities. The government has already called for
 treason laws to be applied to those who ridicule the presidency and its
 occupant. This is meant to silence opposition critics who question
 government claims of plots against it as well as the direction that Moi is
 taking the country in. A government spokesman linked the alleged
 guerilla movements with the opposition. He alleged that the "opposition
 was in league with enemies of Kenya, who are jealous of our peace and
 stability, are busy with subversive activities."4
 In addition, the government has taken steps to silence the buoyant non-
 governmental sector, revitalized by the opening created by the 1992
 elections. A favorite tool of the government is the use of sedition laws to
 criminalize dissent and prohibit the circulation of certain publications.
 Since 1992, two outspoken publications, Society and Finance, have come
 under sharp attack for being critical of the KANU government. Copies of
 both have been confiscated by the state on several occasions. Another
 publication, the Watchman, was targeted by KANU for investigation
 because it was "inciting rebellion, civil disobedience and inter-tribal
 warring.""5 Virtually every medium, except the government-owned press,
 has incurred government displeasure for being outspoken. Reporters of
 the Daily Nation, the country's major daily, have been arrested on
 numerous occasions.
 But the biggest threat, if the statements of government officials are any
 indication, is posed by the growing number of human rights organizations.
 The most prominent of these, the Kenya Human Rights Commission
 (KHRC), has established a reputation for factual, hard-hitting exposes of
 human rights violations by the government. In turn, the government has
 accused its officials of being under the control and pay of foreigners. The
 government accused the KHRC of "soliciting funds from abroad for
 destabilization of the country."'6 The attack was prompted by the effective
 campaign of KHRC to revive the debate on constitutional reform.'7 The
 KHRC is at the head of an increasingly vibrant civil society.
 One of the most serious challenges to the KANU government was
 mounted in 1994 by Mwangaza Trust (MT), a charitable organization
 whose methods of work were highly innovative and grassroots-oriented.
 Though led by the upper crust of Kenya's political and intellectual elites,
 14. "Information Minister calls for laws on treason to be applied," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (London) (17
 February 1995).
 15. "Probe Magazine, Says KANU," Standard (Nairobi) (13 February 1993), p. 6.
 16. Minister Lashes Out at Human Rights Group," Kenya Times (Nairobi) (1 December 1994); "Makau Protests
 Against Kiraitsu's Remark," Daily Nation (Nairobi) (1 December 1994).
 17. LSK, International Commission of Jurists (Kenya chapter) and KHRC, The Kenya We Want: Proposal for a Model
 Constitution (Nairobi: LSK, ICJ-Kenya, and KHRC, 1994).
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 MT quickly turned into a populist grouping partly because of the
 charismatic leadership of Paul Muite, its chair. But it was also able to do
 what no other organization has done, including the government: it
 published its newsletter, Nuru, Kiswahili for light, in all of the country's
 eight major languages, reaching a population that had hitherto been
 ignored.'8 MT committed itself to involving Kenyans in seeking solutions
 to good government, "people-centered" development, equality of the sexes,
 and democracy.'9 On 19 January 1995, the government deregistered MT for
 ''pursuing political activities as opposed to being a charitable
 organization."2" In February, Moi attacked MT and Paul Muite as
 subversive and foreign-directed.2' The government has repeatedly
 demonstrated its inability to tolerate independent political activity.
 Conclusion: Necessity for Institutional Reform
 Although Kenya is now formally a multiparty state, the government
 still governs as if nothing has changed. It arrests, jails, and harasses its
 critics with impunity, and encourages ethnic killings even as its officials are
 involved in high level corruption. This conduct is possible because it was
 the form of the law-not its substance-that was changed to allow the
 contested election in 1992. Repressive laws and state institutions, many of
 them carryovers from the colonial state, remain intact. The constitution,
 the supreme law of the land, is an invitation to an autocratic presidency.22
 In addition to reforming laws affecting political competition to level the
 playing field, laws limiting speech and political participation must be
 repealed or amended to reflect the guarantees in Kenya's bill of rights.
 These laws include: the detention law or the PPSA under which
 government opponents have been dispatched without a hearing in the past;
 the Public Order Act which allows despotic local administrators to deny
 assembly and associational rights to those critical of the government; the
 Chief's Authority Act, which gives local government agents the power to
 regulate all activity, including weddings and burials; the Societies Act, the
 law that regulates non-governmental organization and has often been used
 18. In its first edition Nuru carried the suggestive sub-headline: "light in the dark cave." See Nuru (Nairobi) (October
 1994), p. 1.
 19. Mwangaza Trust, Mwangaza Trust: Mobilizing for Positive Change (Nairobi: Mwangaza Trust, 1994).
 20. "High Court allows charity deregistered for opposition activities to appeal," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
 (London) (10 February 1995).
 21. Ibid.
 22. "President Moi says NGOs subversive," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (London) (13 February 1995).
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 to deny registration to groups independent of the ruling party; and the
 sections of the penal code that provide for seditious offenses and the
 prohibition of certain publications.
 Finally, a new configuration of powers among the executive, the
 judiciary, and the parliament must be instituted to limit the concentration
 of virtually all power in the hands of the president. The president's
 absolute powers in appointing members of the electoral commission, the
 official body mandated to organize, run, and monitor elections must be
 sharply reduced. Similarly, his powers to appoint senior judges without
 any parliamentary input needs reform. The same is true of other key
 public service appointments, including heads of parastatal organizations
 and diplomats. Some of these powers must be reduced and the remaining
 equally shared with parliament. The only sure method of effecting such
 changes is through a general review, in the setting of a constitutional
 conference, of all laws and institutions governing the country. Only
 through such a process can the arbitrary abuse of power by a few, and the
 commission of human rights abuses against the many by state officials, be
 punished and ultimately prevented.
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